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Securities Regulation: Protecting Auditor Independence
from Non-Audit Services - An Evolving Standard
L Introduction
Investor confidence in the integrity of publicly available financial information
is the cornerstone of our securities markets. Investors are more willing to commit
their capital in markets if they believe that the financial information is reliable.'
Auditors play a key role in the capital formation process by ensuring that the
financial information that investors rely upon is as accurate as possible.
These auditors, using Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS), examine
corporate financial statements and express their opinion as to whether the financial
statements, taken as a whole, fairly reflect the financial position of a company in
accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP).2 An auditor's
opinion is not a guarantee that the financial statements are accurate, but rather an
assurance that an independent, unbiased professional has strictly examined the
financial statements? Auditors must be independent from the companies they audit
in order to provide impartial and objective examinations of financial information
in which investors can have confidence.
One of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (the Commission) primary
roles is to protect the millions of people who invest in the United States' securities
markets by ensuring that independent auditors review the financial statements
prepared by public companies.4 This role serves two important public policies.
First, it fosters accurate audits by removing or minimizing the possibility that
external factors will influence an auditor's judgment! Second, it promotes investor
confidence in the reliability and integrity of the financial statements of publicly
traded companies.6 To meet these public policy goals, the Commission must
ensure that the auditor independence requirements remain relevant and effective.
1. See Relationships Between Registrants and Independent Accountants, Accounting Release No.
296, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 172,318, at 62,934,62,936 (Aug. 20, 1981),
reprinted in Matters Relating to Independent Accountants, Codification of Financial Reporting Policies
§ 601.01, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 73,251, at 62,882 (2000) ("An investor's willingness to commit
his capital to an impersonal market is dependent on the availability of accurate, material and timely
information regarding the corporations in which he has invested or proposes to invest.").
2. See CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing
Standards No. 58, § 508.10 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1993).
3. See Kenneth Edward Shore, Comment, Watching the Watchdog: An Argument for Auditor
Liability to Third Parties, 53 SMU L. REv. 387, 391 (2000).
4. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,148
(proposed July 12, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240).
5. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008, 76,012
(Dec. 5, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240).
6. Id.
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On December 5, 2000, the Commission adopted revised auditor independence
requirements to Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X (the Final Rule) The purpose of
this note is to examine the provisions of the Final Rule concerning non-audit
services provided by the auditor to the publicly traded audit client. This note will
(1) inform practitioners of the fundamental importance of independent auditors and
of the non-audit services that they may no longer provide to audit clients; (2)
analyze the general framework for evaluating independence under the Final Rule;
(3) review several of the consequences of the Final Rule; and (4) discuss the effect
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley Act) on the Final Rule.'
Part II of this note will examine the vital role that auditors play, discuss the
changes that have made auditor independence reform necessary, and illustrate the
consequences of a loss of independence. Part I discusses the debate over
adopting a provision concerning non-audit services, outlines the format of the Final
Rule adopted by the Commission, and discusses some of the changes that have
occurred since the bankruptcy of Enron, most notably, the enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
iI. The Unique Role of the Auditor
A. The Role of the Independent Auditor
1. Independent Auditor Defined
Independence refers to an auditor's state of mind.' The American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) establishes professional standards that
member Certified Public Accountants (CPA) must observe. These standards
include both a Code of Professional Conduct and a Codification of Statements on
Auditing Standards."0 Article IV of the AICPA's Code of Professional Conduct
states: "A member should maintain objectivity and be free of conflicts of interest
in discharging professional responsibilities. A member in public practice should be
independent in fact and appearance when providing auditing and other attestation
services."" The Code of Professional Conduct further provides: "The principle
of objectivity imposes the obligation to be impartial, intellectually honest, and free




By requiring the auditor to be objective and unbiased, both in fact and
appearance, the AICPA's standards regulate the auditor's two primary roles. First,
7. Id. at 76,008; Qualifications of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2001).
8. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
9. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,009.
10. See generally CODE OF PROFL CONDUCT (American Inst. of Certified Public Accountants 1992).
reprinted in 2 AIPCA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 4269 (American Inst. of Certified Public Accountants
1995); CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards
No. 58 (American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1993).
1I. CODE OF PROFeL CONDUCT ET § 55 (American Inst. of Certified Public Accountants 1992),
reprinted in 2 AIPCA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS 4269 (American Inst. of Certified Public Accountants
1995).




the standards attempt to provide reliable financial information by requiring rigorous
and unbiased examinations." Second, the standards attempt to assure the investing
public that the information is reliable because it has undergone rigorous and
unbiased examinations."' If investors do not believe that an auditor is independent
of the audited company, both in fact and appearance, they will have less
confidence in the financial information that auditors provide, and they will be far
less likely to purchase the securities of public companies."
2. The Auditor's Role in Securities Law
The Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934 expressly require that
independent CPAs audit certain financial statements.'6 A company desiring to
issue stock must have an opinion from an independent auditor to satisfy the
statutory requirements that are a prerequisite to selling securities in the market. 7
In addition, securities law requires publicly traded companies to file audited
financial reports on a regular basis with the Commission.'"
When Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933, it considered creating a corps
of government auditors to review and audit companies' financial statements.'
Alternatively, Congress considered mandating federal licensing of all auditors.'
Instead of creating a large government entity, Congress entrusted the accounting
profession with the responsibility of auditing the financial statements of Commis-
sion registrants with the understanding that outside accounting firms would be
independent from management."'
As a result of the statutory requirements of obtaining an audit before entering
the stock market and filing annual financial statements, in the fiscal year ending
September 30, 1999, the Commission received an aggregate of $2.1 trillion in
public offering filings and 13,460 annual reports." In Touche Ross & Co. v.
SEC,2 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the fact that because the
Commission is unable to review in detail the vast amount of annual reports that
companies submit, the accounting profession is primarily responsible for the
13. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,012.
14. See id.
15. See generally Relationships Between Registrants and Independent Accountants, Accounting
Release No. 296, (1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,318, at 62,934 (Aug. 20,
1981), reprinted in Matters Relating to Independent Accountants, Codification of Financial Reporting
Policies § 601.01, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 'i 73,251, at 62,882 (2000).
16. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa (2000); Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m
(2000).
17. See Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000).
18. Id.
19. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,148, 43,150
(proposed July 12, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 43,150 n.17 (citing Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 73d Cong. 55-60 (1933)).
22. Id. at 43,150.
23. 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979).
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integrity of the financial information.' This holding recognizes the fact that it is
physically impossible for the Commission to review 13,460 annual reports with the
same amount of detailed analysis that one auditor can provide one audit client.
The system that Congress created requires companies to file audited financial
statements to gain access to capital markets, while placing primary responsibility
for the accuracy of financial statements on auditors rather than on a government
agency. This system places the auditor in a position of great public trust. In
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., " the United States Supreme Court
recognized the unique role of the auditor when it declined to extend to auditors
certain confidentiality protections that are available to a lawyer and a client.2' The
Court stated, "By certifying the public reports that collectively depict a cor-
poration's financial status, the independent auditor assumes a public respon-
sibility . . . [and] owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and
stockholders, as well as to the investing public."'" The Court went on to say,
"This 'public watchdog' function demands that the accountant maintain total
independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity to the
public trust."' Recognizing the auditor's need for independence from those they
audit, the Commission's task in this area is to "address the influences that
reasonably could be expected to pose an unacceptable risk that an auditor would
lose his or her objectivity or that reasonable persons would perceive a loss of
objectivity.""
B. The Need For Change
i. Changes in the Market and Mentality
The Commission last amended the auditor independence requirements in 1983.3"
Since then, the market economy and the accounting industry have transformed
dramatically. Accounting firms today have to compete on a global scale and, as
a result, have merged into larger corporations that offer a broader array of
services." Accounting firms are changing into primarily business advisory service
firms as the number, revenue, and type of non-audit services increase. 2 Fre-
quently, companies are turning to their auditors to perform services such as
internal auditing, evaluating business controls, providing tax services, implementing
information system services, designing pension plans, and developing marketing
plans.' From 1993 to 1999, accounting firms' revenue for non-audit services grew
24. Id. at 580-81.
25. 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
26. /i at 817.
27. id. at 817-18.
28. Id. at 818.
29. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,148,43,151
(proposed July 12, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240).
30. l4 at 43,148.
31. Id.
32. Id.




at an average annual rate of 26% compared to 9% for audit services.' As a
result, revenues from these services comprise an estimated 50% of total revenues
for the top five public accounting firms.35 By comparison, in 1981, these service
lines provided only 13% of total revenue.
Coinciding with the market transformation, the mentality of the auditor has
changed from that of a "public watchdog" to that of a business consultant." Some
accounting firms are beginning to treat the audit merely as a commodity used to
acquire the more lucrative non-audit fees. In fact, some of these firms treat audit
services as "loss leaders," that is, they sell the audit service below cost to build a
relationship with a potential client for the firm's non-audit services.39
This change in mentality is blatantly evidenced in an AICPA practice aid
entitled Make Audits Pay: Leveraging the Audit Into Consulting Services."
Indeed, this guide quotes an AICPA officer as saying, "'We see the greater
viability of the CPA going forward as being a strategic business adviser, an
information professional being viewed by the public as the person for solid big-
picture business advice - applied to a broader information world instead of a
financial information world."'' The guide further states that "'[tjhe business
adviser is a client advocate. The entire business adviser audit process is based on
understanding the client's business from the owner's perspective and acting in the
owner's best interest,' 42 which the Commission noted is contrary to the auditor's
public duty. 3 The most troubling aspect of this change is that it comes directly
from the AICPA, the body primarily in charge of establishing the rules and ethical
standards for the accounting industry prior to the establishment of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.' Part III.D
will further discuss this new oversight board.
The Commission believes that the growth in non-audit services jeopardizes
auditor independence in two principal ways. First, as the percentage of income
from non-audit services increases, auditors face more pressure in challenging a




37. Id. at 43,148; see also Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65
Fed. Reg. 76,008, 76,013 (Dec. 5, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240).
38; THE PANEL ON AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 4.4, at 99 (Pub.
Oversight Bd. Aug. 31, 2000) [hereinafter PANEL REPORT], available at http://www.pobauditpanel.org/
download.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2002).
39. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,016.
40. MICHAEL J. RAMOS, MAKE AUDITS PAY: LEVERAGING THE AUDIT INTO CONSULTING SERVICES
(American Inst. of Certified Pub. Accountants 1999) [hereinafter MAKE AUDITS PAY].
41. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,015
(quoting MAKE AUDITS PAY, supra note 40, at 3).
42. Id. (quoting MAKE AUDITS PAY, supra note 40, at 24).
43. Id.
44. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107, § 101, 116 Stat. 745.
2002]
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work."' The Commission is not only concerned with the incentives auditors have
to violate their independence requirements, but also that the public will view these
incentives as impairments to independence.' Second, certain non-audit services
provided by the auditor "create inherent conflicts that are incompatible with
objectivity,""' such as providing bookkeeping services or setting up controversial
partnerships and then later auditing one's own work.
2. Increased Pressure on Earnings
In 1999, an estimated 48.2% of U.S. households owned equities, compared to
19% in 1983. 4' This change in ownership has focused America's attention, as well
as its financial security, on the stock market as never before.4' In addition,
technology has given investors increasingly direct access to financial information,
allowing for quick and decisive action upon almost any change in a company's
financial results.' These and other market changes have made Americans
"'enormously dependent on independent auditors, both to ... ensure the reliability
of the information they use to make individual investment decisions and to ensure
the efficiency of the marketplace in assigning value to stocks.""' The decision to
invest and the extent of that investment both rely heavily on the reliability and
accuracy of the underlying financial data. 2
In addition to the above changes, the Public Oversight Board's Panel on Audit
Effectiveness (the Panel Report) stated:
The growth in equity values over the past decade has introduced
extreme pressures on management to achieve earnings, revenue or
other targets. These pressures are exacerbated by the unforgiving
nature of the equity markets as securities valuations are drastically
adjusted downward whenever companies fail to meet "street" expec-
tations. . . . These pressures on management, in turn, translate into
pressures on how auditors conduct audits and in their relationship with
audit clients."
45. Id.
46. See Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,148,
43,149 (proposed July 12, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240).
47. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,015.
48. Id. at 76,009 n.12 (citing SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION, 2001 BRIEFING BOOK- CAPITAL
MARKETS 3 (2001), available at http://www.sia.com/publicationspdf/BBchapteri.pdf (last visited Sept.
12, 2002)).
49. See, e.g., id. at 76,009 n.13 (quoting the testimony of Senator Howard Metzenbaum (Ret.),
Chairman, Consumer Federation of America (Sept. 20, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
extra/audmin3.htm (modified Oct. 5, 2000)).
50. Id. at 76,009.
51. Id. at 76,009 n. 13 (quoting testimony of Senator Metzenbaum, supra note 49).
52. See Relationships Between Registrants and Independent Accountants, Accounting Release No.
296, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 172,318, at 62,934, 62,936 (Aug. 20, 1981),
reprinted in Matters Relating to Independent Accountants, Codification of Financial Reporting Policies
§ 601.01, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 173,251, at 62,882 (2000).




In short, increased household participation in the stock market, widely available
financial information, and drastic stock price changes caused by missed earnings
estimates have created tremendous pressure on companies to manage earnings to
meet investor expectations. The increased pressure on management and the auditor,
combined with substantial non-audit fees, have made it increasingly difficult for
auditors to maintain their independence.
C. Consequences of Impaired Independence
"In February 1998, Waste Management, Inc. announced that it was restating its
financial statements for the five-year period 1992 through 19 9 6 .
' In the res-
tatement, Waste Management admitted that, through 1996, it had materially
overstated its reported pretax income by more than $1.4 billion, which was the
largest restatement in the Commission's history - until Worldcom's $3.8 billion
restatement in July 2002."5 During this same period, Arthur Andersen issued
unqualified or clean opinions for Waste Management's financial statements. 56 On
June 19, 2001, the Commission brought a settled enforcement action against Arthur
Andersen LLP (Andersen) and four individuals in connection with Andersen's
audits of Waste Management's financial statements.57
The Commission's complaint alleged that Andersen knowingly or recklessly
issued false and misleading unqualified audit reports for Waste Management's
financial statements by stating that the statements conformed to GAAP and that the
audit was done in accordance with GAAS.5" For the years in question, Waste
Management had improperly increased reported operating income primarily through
understating current operating expenses by deferring recognition of expenses into
the future."s The audit engagement team repeatedly brought this practice, among
others, to the attention of the Andersen engagement partner; however, Andersen
still issued unqualified opinions on the engagement partner's premise that the
misstatements were not material.'
This conduct took place against the following background: (1) Andersen
regarded Waste Management as a "crown jewel" client; (2) every chief financial
officer (CFO) and chief accounting officer (CAO) in Waste Management's history
had previously worked for Andersen as an auditor; (3) between 1991 and 1997,
Andersen billed Waste Management $7.5 million in audit fees and $11.8 million
in non-audit fees; (4) a related entity, Andersen Consulting, known now as
Accenture, billed Waste Management approximately $6 million in non-audit fees;
54. SEC v. Arthur Andersen LLP, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1410, 7 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 74,925, at 63,069 (June 19, 2001).
55. Id.; WorldCom Comments on Indictment Reports, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2002, at A4 [hereinafter
WorldCom Comments].
56. SEC v. Arthur Andersen LLP, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1410, 7 Fed.






Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
(5) the engagement partner for the audit was also the marketing director in charge
of cross-selling non-audit services to audit clients; and (6) the engagement partner's
compensation took into account the firm's billing for audit and non-audit
services."
Given the gravity and duration of the misconduct, the nature and magnitude of
the misstatements, and the circumstances of the case, the Commission decided to
bring an action against Andersen. 2 As a result, Andersen, without admitting or
denying the allegations, consented to the entry of a permanent antifraud injunction
and the then-largest-ever civil penalty of $7 million. 3
As a result of Waste Management's earnings restatement, the firm's stock price
declined more than 50%, causing investors to lose millions in equity.' Soon
thereafter, Waste Management settled a shareholder class action lawsuit for
violations of federal securities laws for $457 million, and Andersen settled a
derivative lawsuit for $20 million." In addition, in 2002, after a four-year
investigation, the Commission filed a complaint accusing six former Waste
Management executives of securities fraud.' This single occurrence of impaired
auditor independence resulted in the loss or unproductive use of hundreds of
millions of dollars, years of litigation, and a blemish on the reliability of our
financial system.
Waste Management is unfortunately one of several occurrences of impaired
independence.' In 2000, Rite Aid Corporation filed an earnings restatement,
admitting that it had overstated earnings by more than $1 billion over two ylears "
The resulting lawsuit alleged that KPMG, Rite Aid's auditor, received audit fees
that were less than 20% of non-audit fees over a two-and-a-half-year period in the
late 1990s.' In addition, the suit alleged that Rite Aid's then-chairman awarded
KPMG consulting engagements worth $1.5 million "as a sweetener and to ensure
the accounting firm's continued cooperation." '70 The suit alleged that this






64. See Waste Management 'Puffed Up' Earnings, Shareholder Suit Alleges, Bus. WIRE, Dec. 1,
1997, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
65. Press Release, Waste Management, Waste Management Announces agreements to Settle
Securities Class Action Lawsuit and Arthur Andersen Derivative Lawsuit (Nov. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.wm.com/press/PR/2001/pressOl46.asp (last visited Sept. 12, 2002).
66. Jonathan Weil & Michael Schroeder, Waste Management Suit by SEC Zings Andersen, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 27, 2002, at CI.
67. For a more expansive discussion see Paul R. Brown et al., Administrative and Judicial
Approaches to Auditor Independence, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 443 (2000).








Ironically, Waste Management and Rite Aid shareholders can consider
themselves lucky. These companies continued to exist after the accounting
irregularities and restatements so that shareholders could sue and recover some of
their losses.' All too often, the disclosure of massive financial fraud results in the
bankruptcy of the corporation, and shareholders are stuck with a majority of the
losses.73
Enron is an excellent case in point. Shareholders and employees observed
Enron's stock plunge in value to next-to-nothing after the company filed a financial
restatement announcing accounting irregularities related to controversial partner-
ships set up by Andersen.74 Enron filed for bankruptcy protection, which was the
largest in U.S. history" prior to Worldcom." The plunge in stock price has
decimated shareholders' equity and employee pension plans heavily invested in
Enron stock, leaving some employees with almost no retirement at all." Andersen
has also incurred substantial losses from this tragedy. A federal jury has found
Andersen guilty of obstruction of justice, a felony, which precludes Andersen from
auditing public companies - effectively putting Andersen out of business.7" Most
recently, Worldcom filed for bankruptcy protection, which will likely wipe out its
shareholders' interests as well."
In addition to the general economic deterioration and loss of investor confidence
that occurs, the individual losses from accounting irregularities and fraud can be
tremendous. This is a frightening situation when one considers that the occurrence
of financial restatements nearly doubled for all industries from 1997 to 2000.'"
NWhile it is too early to draw any conclusions as to whether non-audit services
impaired auditor independence in the Enron bankruptcy, Enron's financial reports
stated that, in 2001, Andersen received $27 million in non-audit service fees and
$25 million in audit fees from Enron." This translates into over $1 million a
week in fees. This is by no means conclusive evidence, but once again a massive
accounting irregularity and financial restatement were accompanied by the auditor
72. See In re Waste Management, Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 590 (S.D. Tex. 2002); In re Rite
Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 146 F. Supp. 2d 706 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
73. See Shore, supra note 3. at 398.
74. William Neikirk & Melita Marie Garza, Andersen's Chief Grilled; CEO Says Enron Withheld
Details That Would Have Tipped Off Auditors, CHI. TtIB., Feb. 6, 2002, at 1; John R. Wilke, FBI Probes
Army Secretary on Enron, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2002, at A3.
75. See Hilzenrath, supra note 68, at Al.
76. See WorldCom Comments, supra note 55.
77. See Hilzenrath, supra note 68, at Al.
78. Ken Brown, Andersen Might Face More Legal Problems Beyond Guilty Verdict, WALL ST. J.,
June 17, 2002, at CI.
79. Shawn Young, Henry Sender, & Deborah Soloman, WorldCom Gets Judges Approval for $750
Million in Financing, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2002, at A3.
80. Karl Schoenberger, When the Numbers Just Don't Add Up, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2001, § 3, at
I.
8 1. Cassell Bryan-Low, Auditors Still Perform Non-Audit Services, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2002, at
20021
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receiving substantial non-audit fees. This note discusses the consequences of the
Enron bankruptcy further in Part III.D.
III. The Commission Modernizes the Rules
A. The Debate Over Non-Audit Services Prior to Enron and the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act
I. Supporters of an Exclusionary Ban
When the Commission decided to modernize the independence requirements, it
encountered two basic ideologies regarding the correct path concerning non-audit
services. One school supports an exclusionary ban, with certain carved-out
exceptions, that bars the auditor from providing non-audit services to audit
clients." The other school, which includes the AICPA, supports the specifically
prohibited exclusions on non-audit services of the then-current law with the
possibility of including others after more research and debate. 3 The Panel Report,
which was divided on which school of thought was more prudent, thoroughly
explored these two schools.'
Panel members who supported an exclusionary ban argued that when an auditor
provides non-audit services to an audit client, the audit firm is really serving two
masters." First, the auditor is serving management by providing non-audit
management consulting services.' Second, the auditor is serving shareholders and
the investing public by providing the audit."7 These supporters believe that
providing both audit and non-audit services places a duty of loyalty on the auditing
firm to both groups of clients." By serving both groups, the supporters noted that
"the firm is subject to conflicts of interest that tear at the fragile fabric of loyalty
owed to one client or the other."' These Panel members believe that "the
existence of dual loyalties creates a serious appearance problem," independent of
whether, in a particular case, there was impaired independence in fact.9'
Those Panel members supporting an exclusionary ban also believe that providing
non-audit services gives the audit firm prospective revenues that create financial
stakes in the audit client, which produce conflicts of interest "capable of impairing
independence."9' They contended that this is especially true as long as accounting
firms expect and reward the marketing of non-audit services by auditors to their
82. PANEL REPORT, supra note 38, 5.32, at 118. See generally Barry Melancon, The Proposed
SEC Rule on Auditor Independence and Its Comequences, J. Accr., Oct. 2000, at 26.
83. PANEL REPORT, supra note 38, 15.52, at 130.
84. See generally id. at ch. 5.










audit clients. 2 These Panel members argued that an exclusionary ban on non-
audit services to audit clients is the only way to achieve the goal of protecting
auditor independence and investor confidence because it would avoid all potential
conflicts of interest that may arise. 3
2. Opponents of an Exclusionary Ban
Panel members that oppose the exclusionary ban believe that audit firms can
provide both audit and non-audit services to the same client and maintain indepen-
dence and objectivity.' These Panel members believe that many non-audit
services are in the public interest and beneficial to audit effectiveness." As an
example, a company may receive assistance from its auditor in correcting control
weaknesses discovered during the audit. The public interest is served due to
strengthened controls within the company, and audit effectiveness is improved
because of the auditor's increased knowledge of the company's systems.'
These members argued that limiting the non-audit services that auditors provide
may disserve the public interest because the company may not improve its controls
due to the "potential added costs and efforts" of hiring a firm, other than the
auditor, who already has knowledge of the problem. 7 The auditing company has
an excellent and cost-effective ability to uncover the audit client's opportunities and
risks and to address them efficiently because these auditors have a privileged and
legally required opportunity to access and attest client records." Furthermore, not
providing non-audit services would limit the amount of knowledge in the
accounting firm about the client, thereby diminishing audit effectiveness."
Opponents to an exclusionary ban also asserted that there is a "lack of any
specific link between audit failures and the rendering of non-audit services" to
audit clients.'" For example, the Panel Report reviewed thirty-seven audit
engagements involving non-audit services to audit clients and did not find any
instance where the "non-audit services had a negative [impact] on audit effec-
tiveness.'.. In fact, the Panel found that some services actually had a positive
impact on the audit."°
In addition to the lack of a link between audit failures and non-audit services,
there is a question as to whether providing non-audit services affects investor
confidence."'3 Phase I of the Earnscliffe Report to the United States Indepen-
92. Id. 1 5.39(8), at 122.
93. Id. 'I 5.39, at 119.
94. Id. 1 5.40, at 127.
95. Id. '15.44, at 127.
96. Id. '1 5.44, at 127-28.
97. Id. 1 5.45, at 128.
98. Id. 'I 5.39(17), at 125.
99. Id. 'I 5.50, at 129.
100. Id. 1 5.43, at 127.
101. Id. 'I 5.17-.18, at 113.
102. Id. 15.18, at 113.
103. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008,
76,019 (Dec. 5, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240).
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dence Board stated: "The vast majority of respondents believe that auditors are
currently performing audits, which meet a high standard of objectivity and
independence.""' In Phase II, Earnscliffe reports that of those surveyed, "'[miost
had a high degree of confidence in the quality and reliability of the information
that was available for them to use in making investment decisions." ''  l Thus,
evidence exists that the public views auditors as appearing independent and that
they have confidence in the information available to them. Those opposing an
exclusionary ban are "reluctant to change the rules [without] any compelling
evidence of a problem."s.1
6
3. The Commission Decides to Act
While no conclusive evidence existed at the time of the passing of the Final
Rule that non-audit services were negatively affecting audit effectiveness, some
evidence showed that these non-audit services were affecting investor confidence
in the independence of auditors. "In a June 2000 study, Brand Finance surveyed
analysts and representatives of companies listed on the London Stock Ex-
change."'" In the survey, 94% of analysts and 76% of companies "stating an
opinion believe[d] that significant non-audit fees are likely to compromise audit
independence. 'ON
Phase II of the Earnscliffe study noted that "'[miost [interviewees] felt that risks
of unfavorable perceptions of auditor independence are growing, due largely to the
provision of non-audit services to auditees.""' In addition, the Panel Report
found that "[a]lmost two-thirds of the respondents to the Panel's survey from
outside the [accounting] profession" expressed concern over non-audit services. °
Although no conclusive evidence exists that non-audit services are affecting
investor confidence in audited financial information, the Commission stated that
it could not "take lightly suggestions that even a minority portion of the
population" is concerned over the appearance of impaired independence "or that
their confidence is being undermined.""'
104. Id. (quoting EARNSCLIFFE RESEARCH & COMMUNICATIONS, REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES
INDEPENDENCE BOARD: RESEARCH INTO PERCEPTIONS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY
8 (Nov. 1999), available at Independence Standards Board, Document Express, General Information,
Research, Auditor Independence and Objectivity - Phase I. December 1999, http://www.
cpaindependence.org/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2002)).
105. Id. (quoting EARNSCLUFFE RESEARCH & COMMUNICATIONS, REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES
INDEPENDENCE BOARD: RESEARCH INTO PERCEPTIONS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE AND OBJECTIVITY -
PHASE i 44 (July 2000) [hereinafter EARNSCLIFFE II, available at Independence Standards Board,
Document Express, General Information, Research. Auditor Independence - Phase II, August 2000,
http./www.cpaindependence.orgl (last visited Sept. 12, 2002)).
106. PANEL REPORT, supra note 38, 15.43, at 127; see aLso Melancon, supra note 82, at 26 (stating
that the "scope-of-services rule is a solution in search of a problem").
107. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,018.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 76,017 (alterations in original) (quoting EARNSCLIFFE I1, supra note 105, at 5).
110. See PANEL REPORT, supra note 38, 1 5.20, at 113.




Addressing the issue of the lack of evidence linking non-audit services to audit
failures, the Commission stated that searching for conclusive evidence "misses the
point. '  Indeed, the Commission is not only concerned with audit failures, but
also audit errors that may result in the "gray area" due to subtle pressures to bend
to the client's interests to preserve non-audit fees."' In addition, the Commission
asserts that unless the auditor participates in fraud or admits to being biased, it
"cannot know with absolute certainty whether an auditor's mind is, or at the time
of the audit was, 'objective.""' Thus, the Commission believes that the
"resolution of this issue must rest on our informed judgment rather than
mathematical certainty."'' 5
B. The Commission Adopts a Two-Pronged Approach
The Commission recognized that a flat prohibition of all non-audit services
would provide the "greatest assurance of auditor independence" because this would
remove the economic incentives for auditors as well as any conflicts of interest
that may arise."' In adopting the Final Rule, the Commission believed that the
best approach was "to draw a series of lines," based on "informed judgment," that
identify "dangerous circumstances" or relationships that auditors must avoid."'
The Commission stated that this approach restricts "non-audit services only to the
extent necessary to protect the integrity and independence of the audit
function."'' . As a result of limiting, rather than banning, non-audit services, the
112. Id. at 76,020.
113. Id. A recent statistical study supports this concern. The study, conducted by the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Michigan State University, and Stanford University, examined whether non-audit
services provided by auditors are negatively correlated with firm value and the quality of earnings.
Richard M. Frankel et al., The Relation Between Auditor's Fees for Non-Audit Services and Earnings
Quality (Jan. 2002) (Stanford University Graduate School of Business, Research Paper No. 1696R), at
http://gobi.stanford.edu/ResearchPapers/Library/RP1696R.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2002). The study used
data collected from over 3000 proxy statements filed with the Commission between February 5, 2001
(the effective date of the Final Rule), and June 15, 2001. Id. at I. The study found a significant negative
stock price response for finns that disclosed the highest unexpected non-audit fees. Id. at 26. A drop in
stock price due to unexpected non-audit fees provides some evidence that investors are concerned with
the amount of non-audit services an auditor provides an audit client.
The study also found that firms with a high ratio of non-audit fees to total fees were more likely to
just meet or barely exceed analysts' forecasts. Id. at Abstract. The results of the study "indicate that firms
purchasing more non-audit services manage earnings to a greater extent than other firms." Id. at 2. This
evidence suggests that large non-audit fees do affect auditor decisions in the gray area because auditors
are more likely to make decisions that support the client's best interest when they receive high non-audit
fees than compared to auditors that do not receive large non-audit fees. Although some have criticized
this study, see Sergio G. Non, Consultants Might Make Friendlier Auditors, CNET NEws.coM., at
http://news.cnet.comrnews/0-1007-200-6996743.htmltag=-bplst (Aug. 29, 2001), it provides some
evidence that non-audit services affect audit quality, earnings management, and decisions in the "gray
area," and that the marketplace agrees with this contention.
114. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,021.
115. Id.




Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
Commission adopted a two-pronged approach in the Final Rule. First, the Final
Rule identifies particular circumstances that are incompatible with indepen-
dence."9 Second, the Commission requires disclosure (the Disclosure Rule) of
the audit and non-audit fees billed by the auditor to the audit client."2 As
discussed below, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has modified both prongs of the Final
Rule. 2'
Under the Disclosure Rule, the audit client's financial statements must include
the aggregate fees billed for: (1) professional services rendered for the audit for
the most recent fiscal year; (2) financial information systems design and
implementation services for the most recent fiscal year; and (3) all other services
provided by the auditor." The Commission believes that the Disclosure Rule
will enable investors to "evaluate for themselves whether the proportion of' non-
audit fees to audit fees raises concerns of independence.2 3 Importantly, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act modified the Disclosure Rule by completely prohibiting
auditors from providing financial information systems design and implementation
services to audit clients.'24
C. The Final Rule
1. Creating a Framework
Prior to the Final Rule, the auditor independence requirements were found in
various Commission rules and interpretations and various ethical rules and
standards of the accounting profession.'" Thus, one goal of the Final Rule is to
"consolidate and make more accessible the standards for auditor independence
under the federal securities laws, . . . and [to] provide [an analytical] framework
for evaluating auditor independence.''2 6
The Final Rule is not meant to be an exhaustive list of "all circumstances that
raise independence concerns.'' 27 While the Final Rule does set forth certain
"restrictions on financial, employment, and business relationships"'" between
119. See generally Qualifications of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4) (2001).
120. See generally Schedule 14A, Item 9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2001).
121. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 745.
122. Item 9(e)(1)-(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2001).
123. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,022.
124. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 745.
125. See generally Relationships Between Registrants and Independent Accountants, Accounting
Release No. 296, [1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 72,3 18, at 62,934 (Aug. 20,
1981), reprinted in Matters Relating to Independent Accountants, Codification of Financial Reporting
Policies § 600, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 73,251, at 62,882 (2000); CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT
(American Inst. of Certified Public Accountants 1992), reprinted in 2 AIPCA PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
4269 (American Inst. of Certified Public Accountants 1995); CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS
AND PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 58 (American Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1993).
126. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,148,
43,157 (proposed July 12, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240).
127. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,030.




auditors and their clients, it also provides a general "framework for analyzing
auditor independence issues '"" that are not specifically addressed in the Rule.
When the Commission evaluates whether an auditor is independent, the Commis-
sion considers whether a relationship or a provision of service:
[1] creates a mutual or conflicting interest, between the accountant and
the audit client; [2] places the accountant in the position of auditing his
or her own work; [3] results in the accountant acting as management
or an employee of the audit client; or [4] places the accountant in a
position of being an advocate for the audit client.'"
These four factors create a body of ethical principles that "play a role [similar]
to . . . the Ethical Considerations in the American Bar Association's Model Code
of Professional Responsibility.''' This is the general framework to which
accountants and auditors can look for guidance when a service raises an
independence issue that the Final Rule does not specifically address, and when
determining whether the Commission would find the service to impair indepen-
dence.
2. The General Standard
Situations and relationships specifically set forth in the Final Rule follow a
bright line test: "[A]n auditor is not independent if he or she maintains the
relationships, acquires the interests or engages in the transactions specified in the
rule."'3 The Commission measures situations or circumstances not addressed in
the Final Rule by the general standard set forth in 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b). Under
this standard:
The Commission will not recognize an accountant as independent,
with respect to an audit client, if the accountant is not, or a reasonable
investor with knowledge of all relevant facts and circumstances would
conclude that the accountant is not, capable of exercising objective and
impartial judgment on all issues encompassed within the accountant's
engagement. In determining whether an accountant is independent, the
Commission will consider all relevant circumstances, including all
relationships between the accountant and the audit client, and not just
those relating to reports filed with the Commission.'
The general standard recognizes that an auditor must be independent in fact and
appearance by incorporating an objective test for independence that is measured
by reference to the reasonable investor with knowledge of all relevant facts and
circumstances. The Commission believes that this objective standard is necessary
129. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,030.
130. Qualifications of Accountants, Preliminary Note (2), 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2001).
131. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,030.
132. Id.
133. Qualifications of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(b) (2001).
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to ensure consistent and uniform application of the law based on observable
circumstances, rather than a subjective inquiry into the accountant's actual state of
mind."
3. Application of the General Standard
a) Non-Audit Services
Section 210.2-01(c) applies the general standard of § 210.2-01(b) to specific
instances. These specific instances set forth a nonexclusive set of circumstances
that the rule deems as inconsistent with the general standard.' The rule divides
these situations into five broad categories: (i) financial relationships, (2)
employment relationships, (3) business relationships, (4) non-audit services, and
(5) contingent fees." This note focuses on the provision relating to non-audit
services.
Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 210.2-01(c)(4) provided a nonexclusive list
of services that an auditor could not provide to an audit client during the
professional engagement period.'3' Subject to numerous exceptions, the auditor
could not provide the following non-audit services for its audit clients: book-
keeping services;" operating or supervising the design and implementation of an
audit client's financial information system;3 appraisal or valuation or fairness
opinions; 0 actuarial services provided to insurance companies;' 1 internal audit
134. Revision of the Commission's Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. at 76,031.
135. Id. at 76,032.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 76,043. The "audit and professional engagement period" includes both the period covered
by the audited financial statements and the engagement period that begins when the accountant either
signs an initial engagement letter or begins an audit or review, whichever is earlier. The professional
engagement period ends when the audit client or the accountant notifies the Commission that the client
is no longer a audit client. See Qualifications of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(f)(5)(i-iii) (2001).
138. Qualifications of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(i) (2001). "'Bookkeeping services"
include maintaining or preparing the audit client's accounting records; preparing the audit client's
financial statements that are filed with the Commission; or preparing the originating source data
underlying the audit client's financial statement. See id. § 210.2-01(c)(4Xi)(l-3). The rule contained
certain exceptions for emergency or unusual situations and for foreign divisions or subsidiaries of audit
clients. See id. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(i)(B)(I-2).
139. Id. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(ii). One of the most significant areas of debate over the Final Rule
concerned the financial information system design and implementation provision. The rule stated that
an accountant was not independent if the accountant designed or implemented a hardware or software
system that was or would be used to generate information that was significant to the audit client's
financial statements taken as a whole. However, the provision contained numerous exceptions. For
example, an auditor could design and implement a system that aggregated the source data underlying the
financial statements of the audit client, provided that the audit client's management acknowledged
primary responsibility for the results, and made all management decisions. See Id. § 210.2-
01 (cX4)(iiXB)( I )-(4).
140. Id. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(iii). The rule prohibited appraisal or fairness opinions where it was
reasonably likely that the results of these services, individually or in the aggregate, would be material
to the financial statements, or where the accountant would audit the results of these services during an
audit. Id. § 210.2-Ol(c)(4)(iii)(A). There were exceptions to this rule for opinions given in connection




services in an amount greater than 40% of the total hours expended on the audit
client's internal audit activities in any one fiscal year;'42  management
functions; 43 human resources;TM  broker-dealer services;' and legal ser-
vices. "
Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act amended section 10A of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (amended section 10A) by enumerating services that
auditors may not provide to public audit clients. Amended section 10A lists the
same prohibited services that the Final Rule prohibited; however, the amendment
adopts a flat prohibition against providing these services by removing the
numerous exceptions contained in § 210.2-1(c)(4).'45  Additionally, the
amendment provides that auditors may only provide non-audit services to an audit
client if the client's audit committee approves the activity in advance. 4" The
commission must adopt regulations consistent with amended section 10A by
February 2003 (the amended Final Rule)."
The amended Final Rule provides a bright-line test and notice to auditors of the
services that they cannot perform. The Commission evaluates those services not
listed by the four general ethical guidelines of the Final Rule - whether providing
the service creates either mutual or conflicting interests, places the accountant in
0 1 (c)(4)(iii)(B)( I)-(4).
141. id. § 210.2-01(c)(4Xiv). The rule incorporated three conditions that, if satisfied, would allow
the auditor to perform limited actuarial services to the insurance company. See id. § 210.2-
0l(c)(4)(iv)(A)(l)-(3), (c)(4)(iv)(B)(I)-(4).
142. Id. § 210.2-Ol(c)(4)(vXA). The rule contained an exception for audit clients with less than
$200 million in total assets. Id. The Final Rule also provided an exception for internal audit services that
were unrelated to the internal accounting controls, financial systems, or financial statements of an audit
client if certain conditions were met, such as designating a competent employee to be responsible for the
audit and evaluating the results of the audit. See id. § 210.2-Ol(c)(4)(v)(BXI)-(6).
143. id. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(vi). "Management functions" include acting temporarily or permanently,
as a director, officer, or employee of an audit client, or performing any decision-making, supervisory,
or ongoing monitoring function for the audit client. Id.
144. Id. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(vii). "Human resources" includes searching for prospective candidates for
managerial, executive, or director positions; engaging in psychological testing; or undertaking reference
checks. See id. § 210.2-01(c)(4Xvii)(A)-(D). The rule included an exception for advising clients on a
candidate's competency for financial accounting, administrative, or control positions. See id. § 210.2-
01(c)(4)(vii)(E).
145. Id. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(viii). "Broker-dealer services" include acting as a broker-dealer, promoter,
or underwriter on behalf of an audit client, making investment decisions, executing buy or sell
transactions, or having custody of assets of the audit client. Id.
146. Id. § 210.2-01(c)(4)(ix). "Legal services" includes providing any service to an audit client
under circumstances in which the person providing the service must be admitted to practice before the
courts of a United States jurisdiction. Id.
147. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 201, 116 Stat. 745.
148. Compare Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. 2002) with
Qualifications of Accountants, 17 C.F.R. 210.2-01(c)(4) (2001).
149. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10A, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (Supp. 2002).
150. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 208(a), 116 Stat. 745.
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a position of auditing his or her own work, or results in the auditor acting as
management, an employee of the client, or as an advocate for the client. "'
D. Changes Since the Enron Bankruptcy
Since the Enron Bankruptcy, several major changes have occurred concerning
the question of auditor independence and providing non-audit services. First, all
of the then-big five accounting firms have spun off portions of their consulting
services in an attempt to maintain the appearance of independence."' However,
accounting firms continue to advise clients on such things as management process,
tax minimization, and corporate finance, obtaining more than an estimated 50% of
revenues from non-audit sources."' Second, in February 2002, the AICPA and
the then-big five accounting firms announced that they would not oppose an
exclusionary ban on providing information technology consulting services and
internal audit services to audit clients." It appears that the Enron scandal may
be serving as the "smoking gun" link between providing non-audit services to audit
clients and impaired auditor independence. This seems especially true given
Andersen's conviction for obstruction of justice based on the shredding of
documents in an attempt to destroy evidence of the auditor's relationship with its
audit client, Enron.
Finally, a wave of changes has occurred in the law concerning non-audit
services. The desire for new "regulation and legislation is based upon the
assumption that Enron is not unique - and indeed, that its sins are pervasive -
which leads to the conclusion that our financial reporting and disclosure system is
flawed or even broken."' 5
On July 30, 2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act became law." In addition to the
provision for amended section 10A prohibiting auditors from providing certain
non-audit services, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act also creates the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (the Board) "to oversee the audit of public companies
that are subject to the securities laws.""' One of the Board's duties is to
"establish or adopt, or both, by rule, auditing quality control, ethics, independence,
and other standards relating to the preparation of audit reports for issuers.""' The
Commission has oversight and enforcement authority over the Board and no rule
of the Board will become effective without prior approval of the Commission.'"
151. See Qualifications of Accountants, Preliminary Note (2), 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01 (2001).
152. Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting Firms are Still Consulting, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 2002, at CI.
153. Id.
154. Jackie Spinner, Accountants Won't Fight Consulting Ban, WASH. POST, Feb. I, 2002, at El;
John J. Huber & Thomas J. Kim, Post-Enron Developments in Disclosure Requirements 3 (Feb. 26,
2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.realcorporatelawyer.comI/EnronLatham.pdf (last
visited on Sept. 12, 2002).
155. Huber & Kim, supra note 154, at 5.
156. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
157. Id. § 101(a).
158. Id. § 101(c)(2).




The Commission may recognize, as generally accepted for purposes of the
securities laws, any accounting principle established by standard setting bodies,
such as the AICPA, that meet certain criteria." Now the accounting industry and
the Board will work together in setting auditing standards under the oversight of
the Commission.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also provides that it shall be unlawful to perform
auditing services to an issuer "if a chief executive officer, controller, [or] chief
financial officer . . . was employed by that registered independent public
accounting firm and participated in any capacity in the audit of that issuer during
the 1-year period preceding the date of the initiation of the audit.''. This
addresses some of the problems that occurred in the Waste Management case.
Another interesting provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act calls for mandatory
audit partner rotation if the audit partner "has performed audit services for that
issuer in each of the 5 previous fiscal years of that issuer."'" Lastly, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act significantly increases the fines and terms of imprisonment for
securities fraud, tampering with official proceedings, and violations of the
Exchange Act of 1934. '63
E. Analysis
The amendments made by the Commission to the auditor independence re-
quirements in the Final Rule were a good first step in an attempt to maintain
independence during the audit by limiting the scope of non-audit services that
auditors may provide. The Commission determined that the best approach to
limiting the types of services an auditor may provide to an audit client was to draw
lines based on "informed judgment" rather than to adopt a flat prohibition."
Unfortunately, narrowly defined rules with numerous exceptions usually produce
"finely tuned evasion," always blurring the line of what is, and what is not,
legal. " ' Congress has addressed these "finely tuned" evasions by placing a flat
prohibition on auditors providing the enumerated services in section 201 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, rather than having the numerous exceptions included in the
Final Rule. However, by not adopting a flat ban on all non-audit services,
Congress has placed a duty on the Commission and the Board to ensure that the
prohibited services and rules remain relevant and effective for protecting our
financial markets. This duty requires active monitoring of the practices in the
industry to ensure that the rules are still relevant given the inevitable industry
changes. By actively monitoring the industry, the Commission can identify other
services, such as tax consulting, that the Commission may need to address in the
future.
160. Id. § 108(a).
161. Id. § 206.
162. Id. § 203.
163. See generally, id. §§ 807, 1102, 1106.
164. Revision of the Commissions Auditor Independence Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008,
76,021 (Dec. 5, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 240).
165. See PANEL REPORT, supra note 38, 'l 5.39(9), at 122.
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The duty that Congress has placed on the Commission and the Board also
requires diligent enforcement of the amended Final Rule to ensure that it is
effective in preserving auditor independence. By meticulously enforcing the
amended Final Rule, the Commission and the Board can help ensure compliance
and determine whether the rules effectively protect the securities markets when
they are followed.
Finally, by not adopting a flat prohibition on non-audit services, Congress has
placed a duty on the accounting profession to ensure that its auditors are indepen-
dent. The firm providing the audit must refocus its attention on performing the
"public watchdog" function of protecting our markets rather than on acquiring non-
audit fees. There must be a shift in the mindset of the accounting industry. Guides
on how to be a business consultant, treating audits as commodities and loss
leaders, or substantially tying an audit engagement partner's salary to the amount
of audit and non-audit services they sell are practices that are no longer acceptable.
The auditor needs to return his focus to providing the most accurate and reliable
financial information to investors that he can without considering the amount of
additional fees that may be jeopardized if he questions the client's books. Any
hesitation on questioning a client's books resulting from fear of jeopardizing other
fees is completely unacceptable given the tremendous cost to society that the
aggregation of these slight hesitations can cause when they culminate in a massive
audit failure. There is no argument for cost efficiencies or synergies resulting from
providing non-audit services to audit clients that can overcome the possibly
devastating effects of even one audit failure.
Unfortunately, remaining completely independent while providing substantial
non-audit services may not be a workable premise. Telling the accounting firm to
just think about what its left hand is doing and to forget about its right may be too
daunting of a task. Active monitoring and diligent enforcement is therefore vital
in determining whether the amended Final Rule is working effectively to protect
our markets or whether more restrictive rules are necessary. Eventually, a flat ban
on non-audit services may prove to be the only effective method of protecting
auditor independence.
IV. Conclusion
The amended Final Rule is a major step in restricting the scope of non-audit
services that auditors may provide to publicly traded audit clients. Now, the
Commission and Board must proactively monitor the effects of the amended Final
Rule to determine its impact on audit effectiveness and auditor behavior and to
determine whether the law is actually protecting the independence of auditors or
whether more restrictive rules are needed. In light of the potentially devastating
consequences to the economy and society caused by a loss of auditor indepen-
dence, the Commission and the Board must err on the side of caution and
prohibition if there is any question whatsoever of whether a service impairs auditor
independence.
Mark Allan Worden
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